2. FOT OVERVIEW
2.1 PROJECT INTRODUCTION
In cooperation with industry, and on behalf of the FHWA, FMCSA sponsored the
Hazardous Materials Safety and Security Technology Field Operational Test. The
purpose of this project was to test methods for leveraging technology and operations
to improve HAZMAT transport security and operational efficiency. The evaluation
of this FOT quantified benefits resulting from technology deployments that improve
the security and operational efficiency of HAZMAT shipments from origin to destination.
The Evaluation Team examined the degree to which the operational test fulfilled
the stated objective of improving HAZMAT transport security and efficiency within
discrete HAZMAT shipping scenarios. In addition, the Evaluation Team documented
the HAZMAT shipments from origin to destination via a detailed benefit-cost
assessment focusing separately on security and operational efficiency. The evaluation
process ran parallel to project design and testing with consistent interaction
with the Deployment Team to ensure timely bilateral project information exchange.
The FOT test duration was 18 months. The FOT testing period was 6 months for
each of the nine motor carrier participants. The nine motor carrier participants
had their deployment starts staggered to allow adequate time for proper technology
installation, trouble shooting, data collection and technology de-installation.
Specific timeframes for project activities are presented in Table 2-1.
Table 2-1. FOT Task Order Timeframe
|Task 1: Conducting Risk/Threat Assessment||September to December 2002 |
|Task 2: Develop Concept of Operations||November 2003 to April 2004|
|Task 3: Develop System Requirements||January to April 2003|
|Task 4: Develop System Design||February to May 2003|
|Task 5: Conduct FOT||July 2003 to May 2004|
|Task 6: Evaluation||September 2002 to September 2004|
|Task 7: Deployment Team Final Report||June 2004|
|Task 8: Evaluation Team Final Report||September 2004|
Within the parameters of the larger HAZMAT FOT, four states (New York, Texas,
Illinois, and California) actively participated in the simultaneously conducted
Public Sector add-on FOT, along with the accompanying law enforcement and emergency
response agencies. These various agencies conducted staged scenario exercises
to generate test data and provide enforcement officials’ perspectives on security
benefits for scenario-specific component and system technology applications.
The Public Sector FOT and Evaluation are described in Section 8.
2.2 FOT TECHNOLOGIES
This section details the key functional and technical features for each of
the component FOT technologies scheduled for deployment at the individual technology
level. Technology descriptions not covered in this section are the various computer
systems or servers that enable the core test component technologies to operate
or integrate with one another. The following technologies are described:
- Wireless Satellite and Terrestrial Communications Systems
- Digital phone without GPS (not included in actual FOT deployment)
- Panic Buttons
- Global Login
- Biometric Global Login
- Electronic Supply Chain Manifest
- Intelligent On-Board Computers initiating remote vehicle disabling
- Internal Trailer Door Locking system
- External Electronic Seal
- Tethered Trailer Tracking
- Untethered Trailer Tracking
It should be noted that this evaluation does not endorse any one vendor or
another through the results of this evaluation or the functional product descriptions
that follow. The evaluation’s focus was to explore the functionality represented
by the cited product types tested during the FOT. It was necessary for this
test to consider individual products to collect quantitative and qualitative
test data for the FOT. The specific products used in this FOT should be thought
of as being representative for a class of products that exhibit similar functionalities
in the field, and not as the only technology products to provide potential benefits
in regard to HAZMAT security and operational efficiency.
Satellite/Wireless Terrestrial With GPS Communications Systems
Wireless Communications technologies were deployed for the FOT. This technology
is designed to use Satellite-based global positioning system (GPS) technology
to provide current vehicle positioning, including latitude and longitude readings.
Another Wireless Communication system tested during the FOT was a Terrestrial-based
communication link designed to allow two-way communications. Both Satellite
and Terrestrial Communications are designed to generated vehicle position with
every message. By design, position information for this FOT was generated upon
request from the dispatch computer, and position-reporting frequency was configurable
at the system user’s discretion. Mobile-initiated position-reporting rate is
normally configured at 1-hour intervals.
Some FOT participant carriers utilized macros that provide preformatted “fill-in-the-blank”
messages, which are more cost-effective than free-form messages, can be updated
over the air, and are easily defined by fleet management. All messages are also
acknowledged and have a return receipt option.
Digital Phone Without GPS
This technology permits transmission of integrated work order assignment and
status messaging between motor carrier dispatch and driver utilizing a Binary
Runtime Environment for Wireless (BREW)-enabled digital cellular handset unit.
Table 2-1 displays two code division multiple access (CDMA) BREW phones.
Figure 2-1.CDMA BREW Phones
Software applications allow a carrier the capability to send a driver a load
assignment that the driver will accept or reject. Upon load acceptance, the
driver is provided with specific details pertaining to the particular load assignment.
The software applications enable drivers to send and receive up to five macros
pertaining to progress conditions for each load assignment:
- Accept/Reject Load assignment
“Panic Button” technology enabled a driver to remotely send an emergency alert
notification message either via Satellite or Terrestrial Communications, and/or
utilize the remote Panic Button to disable the vehicle. The Panic Button was
deployed in two physical configurations, which are displayed in Figure 2-2:
- A Panic Button mounted inside the vehicle to send an emergency alert notification.
- A wireless Panic Button that can be carried by the driver to remotely send
an emergency alert and/or use the remote Panic Button to disable the vehicle.
The wireless Panic Button is carried by the driver and has a range of 150
Figure 2-2. Dash-Mounted Panic Button and Wireless Panic
Global Login is an identification technology, which is enabled via the Wireless
Communication system maintained by on-board software. A driver entered login
information (consisting of a user identifier [ID] and password) into a cab-based
interface. The login information was verified within the truck and remotely
using the Wireless Communication system. If the Global Login failed, alert notifications
were sent to the motor carrier for further action, including vehicle disabling.
Biometric Global Login
Biometric Global Login was accomplished via a biometric verification unit in
the motor vehicle as displayed in Figure 2-3. The Biometric system consists
of a Central Processing Unit (CPU) and proprietary firmware that managed a smart
card reader and fingerprint scanner to execute biometric verification on the
driver. By design, the biometric system for this operational test operated with
the on-board communications systems.
Figure 2-3. Biometric Fingerprint Reader.
Electronic Supply Chain Manifest
The electronic supply chain manifest (ESCM) system was designed to provide positive
personnel (chain of custody) identification and load tracking capabilities for
the parties involved with cargo shipments. The ESCM system integrated biometric
verification, smart cards, Internet applications, and on-board Wireless Communications.
During the FOT, the ESCM system was initiated with a shipper biometrically
logging onto the system and creating an electronic manifest, as well as identifying
the load assignment. Upon completion of the electronic manifest, the shipper
transmitted the manifest to a secure central server and logged out. All authorized
users were notified via e-mail regarding the manifest submission. The HAZMAT
shipment information was then stored and routed through a central database.
All authorized users were required to log-on biometrically to gain access to
the ESCM at any point in the shipment. Also, encrypted “smart cards” containing
vital shipper, cargo, and driver information were used to transfer and validate
HAZMAT shipment movement information. Figure 2-4 shows the ESCM visible to FOT
participants displaying manifesting information and manifest transfer details.1
Figure 2-4. ESCM Screen with Manifest Details
Intelligent On-Board Computers
The On-Board Computer (OBC) was integrated with the Wireless Communications/vehicle
operating systems. The OBC permitted the motor vehicle to be disabled in the
event of a security breach. These disabling techniques included blocking fuel
or sending instructions via the Wireless Communications system directly to the
vehicle’s data bus, which caused loss of throttle power to the motor vehicle.
The OBC also was configured to shut down the vehicle whenever there was a loss
of satellite signal strength, such as when cables are tampered with or the receiver
unit is covered. One variant of the vehicle disabling capability that did not
require the use of the OBC was local vehicle disabling. By the driver
depressing the panic button of his key fob, a signal was sent directly to the
vehicle to initiate the disablement. The wireless panic button with local disabling
capability is carried by the driver and has a range of up to 250 feet. This
latter application does not require the OBC to perform the local vehicle disablement.
Internal Trailer Door Lock
The internal door locks enabled a dispatcher with the ability to lock and unlock
trailer door locks via an over-the-air command. Upon arrival at the consignee’s
location, the driver sent trailer “door unlock” requests to the dispatcher.
The dispatcher then sent an unlock command upon verification of the driver request.
Requests to lock and unlock the doors were sent to the dispatcher using the
Wireless Communication System. The OBC then facilitates the execution of the
lock and unlock events. A specific button installed in the dash of the truck
signals the driver as to when the trailer doors can be securely opened.
Once the unlock command has been sent and the driver has pressed the “door
open” button, the driver normally had 20 seconds to open the doors before the
doors would automatically relock. If the doors relock before the driver is able
to open them, the driver contacted the dispatcher to request that the dispatcher
resend the door open command.
Figure 2-5 displays the Internal Door Lock installed in the rear door of a
motor vehicle trailer in this FOT.
Figure 2-5. Internal Cargo Door Lock.
External Electronic Seal
The wireless electronic tag seal (E-seal)
system used for this FOT is a Web-based application designed to automatically
generate an alert notification when a seal is compromised without proper authorization.
The E-seal used short-range Wireless Communications to interface with a mobile
E-seal reader in the vehicle. The mobile reader was connected to the on-board
Wireless Communications device and the cargo alert notifications were transmitted
automatically to the dispatcher. Figure 2-6 displays the E-seal in its distinctive
rugged black box.
Figure 2-6. Electronic Seal.
Internet-based Geofencing and route-monitoring capabilities are designed to
allow authorized users to define a risk area or route to monitor. An “electronic
fence” can be placed around the route or designated landmark on a displayable
Internet-based map. If a driver deviates from a specified route or approaches
a risk area, the Geofencing system should notify the dispatcher. If the vehicle
enters the risk area, an alert notification should be sent to the carrier’s
dispatch center. Figure 2-7 (on the next page) displays one of screens that
a dispatcher may view when tracking a Geofenced motor vehicle.
Tethered Trailer Tracking
For this FOT, Tethered Trailer Tracking was designed to allow dispatchers
to remotely monitor trailer “connect” and “disconnect” events. Tethered Trailer
Tracking should allow users to view connect and disconnect events are by the
installed mobile unit and transmitted to dispatch across a satellite link with
information on the date, time, and connect/disconnect location.
Untethered Trailer Tracking
For this FOT, a proof of concept of this product was used to test Untethered
Trailer Tracking capabilities. This tracking system used the core wireless satellite
tracking system, including Geofencing capabilities. Merging a tethered and an
untethered device documented functionality for an untethered design.
The Untethered Trailer Tracking system is designed to provide real-time trailer
identification regarding connect/disconnect time and location, Geofencing, and
unscheduled movement. The system used a multimode Terrestrial Wireless Communications
technology designed to provide more geographic coverage by eliminating blackouts
and “dead” zones.
Figure 2-7. Geofencing Dispatch Display Map.
2.3 SYSTEM ARCHICTECTURE
The system architecture was designed by the Deployment Team to meet the specified
requirements of the FMCSA Operation Test. Figure 2-8 depicts the System Architecture
for the FMCSA Operational Test.2 Specific technical system details
can be found in Volume III, Section 2: HAZMAT FOT Technical Performance,
Efficiency and Safety Benefits Assessments.
Figure 2-8. HAZMAT Safety and Security FOT System Architecture.
2.4 FOT SCENARIOS
The FOT was separated into four operational scenarios to allow each scenario
to address a distinct segment of the HAZMAT transportation market. Each scenario
deployed a unique set of technology solutions to account for the specific operational
characteristics for a particular sector of the HAZMAT market. The selected technological
solutions for each scenario sought to improve security and operational efficiency
at several cost levels, depending on the comprehensiveness of the deployed technology
set. The four general scenarios for this FOT included:
- Scenario 1: Bulk Fuel Delivery
- Scenario 2: Less Than Truckload High Hazard
- Scenario 3: Bulk Chemical
- Scenario 4: Truckload Explosives
Table 2-2 provides a complete overview display of the multiple scenarios
for this test including motor carrier participants, shippers, consignees, Public
Sector state agency participants, routes, test technologies, and HAZMAT cargo
classifications for each of the FOT designed scenarios. More specifics about
each motor carrier participant are provided in Volume III, Section 1: HAZMAT FOT Overview.
The four scenarios were all scrutinized against security risk profiles
that categorize and prioritize risk based on the potential tactics terrorists
might use, the most likely hazardous materials that could be involved, and by
the of the type of shipment – bulk/truckload or less-than-truckload (LTL). The
rationale for this risk analysis was to determine potential security gaps that
might exist for each scenario.
Table 2-2.Overall FOT Scenario Composition
|Scenario||No. Trucks||Shipper||Carrier||Consignee||State Agency||Routes||Technologies||HAZMAT Cargo|
| 1a || 13 ||Exxon Mobile ||Dupre Transport || Exxon Mobile || TxDPS ||Texas - 120 mile radius of Dallas, San Antonio, Austin||Satellite Comm., Panic Dash, Global Login||Bulk Fuel Delivery - Class 3 Flammable Liquid|
| 1b || 12 || Exxon Mobile ||Cox Petroleum || Exxon Mobile || CHP|| California – from Vernon, CA to central and southern CA ||Satellite Comm., Panic Dash, WPB||Bulk Fuel Delivery – Class 3 Flammable Liquid |
| 2a|| 12 ||GE||Distribution Technologies|
- Progressive Energy
- SC Electric & Gas
- Westinghouse Nuclear
- Eglin AFB
| N/A ||Macon or Reynolds GA to TN, NC, SC, Fl||Satellite Comm., Panic Dash, Global Login, OBC|
- Hydrochloric Acid (Class 8 Corrosive)
- Polyester Resin (Class 3 Flammable)
ethelene(Class 6.1 Poison)
| 2b || 13 || Betz&Hercules ||Roadway Express|
| N/A || Various||Terrestrial Comm.|
| 3a|| 12 || Various ||Transport Services|| NuFarm Americas, Inc.|| ISP || Midland, MI to Chicago Heights, IL||Satellite Comm., Panic Dash, WPB, Bio. Auth.,ESCM|
- Acetronitrile (Class 3 Flammable)
- Aqua Ammonia (Class 2.2 Non Flammable)
- Nitric Acid (#8 Corrosive)
| 3b|| 7 || DowChemical ||Quality Distribution||N/A||Lima OH to IN, MI, PA ||Satellite Comm., Panic Dash, WPB, Bio. Auth.,ESCM |
- Acetronitrile (Class 3 Flammable)
| 3c|| 6 || BPChemical|| Roeder Cartage|| Evans Chemical ||NYSP &NYDOT || Lima OH to Waterloo, NY||Satellite Comm., Panic Dash,WPB, Bio. Auth., ESCM||
- Acetronitrile (Class 3 Flammable)
| 4a || 12 || BPChemical ||R&R Trucking|| Orica USA ||NYSP &NYDOT || Charlestown IN to NY, NJ & IL Joplin, MO to TX||Satellite Comm., Panic Dash,WPB, Bio. Auth., Seals, Geofencing||Truckload Explosives (Class 1.1-1.6) |
| 4b|| 13||OricaUSA Dyno Nobel||Dyno Transportation|| Dyno Nobel ||ISP &CHP||Joplin, MO to Pittsfield, IL and Lincoln, CA||Satellite Comm., Panic Dash,WPB, Bio. Auth., ESCM, Untethered / Tethered
Trailer Tracking||Truckload Explosives (Class 1.1-1.6) |
1 Battelle, HAZMAT Safety and Security Field Operational Test
Task 4: System Requirements and Design, May 1, 2003.
2 Battelle, HAZMAT Safety and Security Field Operational Test:
Task 4 System Requirements and Design. May 1, 2003.
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